While President Donald Trump’s foreign policy continues to generate scepticism among the US’s Western allies, a different picture is being painted in the Indo-Pacific, particularly concerning the security partnership between Manila and Washington.
When the US exempted the Philippines from its blanket security assistance freeze, it was clear that Washington recognised the importance of investing more in its alliance with Manila. This was further illustrated during US Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth’s visit to Manila on 28 March, marking his first Asian trip stop.
Hegseth and his Filipino counterpart, Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro, issued a joint statement illustrating the alliance’s commitment to enhancing deterrence at a time when China continues to consolidate its military power in the Western Pacific.
More importantly, the officials’ statement was made ahead of this year’s iteration of the Balikatan exercise between American and Filipino troops from 21 April to 9 May. While the Balikatan exercise started as early as 1991, this year’s iteration will likely become the most consequential for various reasons.
A larger Balikatan exercise
The 40th Balikatan exercise is expected to include over 15,000 troops from the Philippines, the US, Australia and Japan. This is significant given that this year’s iteration will witness the full participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces for the first time. All four countries are expected to engage in a full battle test simulation in the South China Sea and Luzon Strait, indicating their willingness to operationalise their partnership further to adapt to the changing strategic realities in the region.
Introducing the Philippines to these systems will improve the Southeast Asian nation’s capacity to deter threats within and beyond its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
This year’s drills will also improve interoperability cooperation between the Philippines and the US, using new and high-end weapon systems. The Philippine Air Force will deploy its Spyder mobile air defence systems, while the Philippine Navy will fire three of its major missile systems — the C-Star surface-to-surface, the Spike Non-Line of Sight (NLOS), and the Mistral surface-to-air missiles.
The US will also be deploying its Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) anti-ship missile system. This follows the US deployment of itsMid-Range Capability (MRC) Typhonmissile system to the Philippines in last year’s iteration. While the Typhon system can launch both Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) and Tomahawk cruise missiles covering a strike range of over 1,600 kilometres, the NMESIS is known for its effectiveness in littoral combat because of its accuracy in hitting maritime moving targets with a range exceeding 185 kilometres.
Strengthening the Philippines’ long-term resilience
Introducing the Philippines to these systems will improve the Southeast Asian nation’s capacity to deter threats within and beyond its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Furthermore, as part of the plan to create a full battle simulation, the 40th Balikatan will also feature integrated air and missile defence exercises for the first time, along with the active participation of the Philippine and US Coast Guards. This will also coincide with preparations for mock attacks at sea and on land.
In addition to the new dimensions in this year’s Balikatan, The Philippines and the US also aim to create the necessary conditions to improve long-term resilience in preparation for the unfolding security dynamics in Western Pacific geopolitics. Washington looks to increase its support for the modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). On 2 April, Washington approved the potential sale of 20 F-16 fighter jets to Manila. If made official, this sale will significantly bolster the Philippine Air Force’s fighter fleet, which currently has 11 South Korean-made FA-50 jets.
Another important development is the plan of both allies to pursue defence industrial base cooperation. In this regard, the Philippines and the US aim to deepen technology cooperation and begin joint production of unmanned systems. This will complement the Philippines’ Self-Reliant Defence Posture Program and serve as a crucial step toward narrowing the Southeast Asian country’s logistical gap during military operations.
... the Armed Forces of the Philippines chief General Romeo Brawner Jr emphasised the need for the Philippine military to prepare in the event of a potential invasion of Taiwan by China.
More joint attention on developments in the Taiwan Strait
Moreover, as China continues to increase its strategic posturing in the first island chain, the alliance is also preparing for contingencies if China were to invade Taiwan. Given the Philippines’ geography, its commitments under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and the presence of over 150,000 Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in Taiwan, whatever happens to the island nation will significantly impact the Philippines’ security interests. More recently, the Armed Forces of the Philippines chief General Romeo Brawner Jr emphasised the need for the Philippine military to prepare in the event of a potential invasion of Taiwan by China.
Consequently, the past two years have witnessed an increase in Manila’s and Washington’s attentiveness towards the developments in the Taiwan Strait, such as the expansion of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the north of the Philippines in April 2023, and the opening of a Philippine Coast Guard station in Batanes in May 2024.
The US and the Philippines can enhance collective deterrence and preparedness by deploying more assets in Northern Luzon and its adjacent waters. More recently, the US Special Operations Forces and the Philippine Marines have also begun their bilateral training on complex landing scenarios in the Southeast Asian country’s northern province of Batanes.
Washington’s long-term interests are anchored in the relative position of the US in the Indo-Pacific — more than any other region.
Trump administration’s focus
Based on these developments, three interrelated assumptions can be drawn. First, the Trump administration identifies China as the most critical threat to US security. Second, Washington’s long-term interests are anchored in the relative position of the US in the Indo-Pacific — more than any other region.
Third, despite being known for cutting deals with competitors, the Trump administration recognises the difficulties in pursuing a successful arrangement with Beijing in a way that would be in Washington’s favour, given China’s geographic advantage, increased assets and deepening economic linkages with regional countries. Hence, it would be arduous for the US to negotiate with China from a position of strength. Therefore, the best course of action for Washington would be to invest in its security partnerships with allies that have the political will to punch above their weight in order to deter China’s aggression.
In this light, the Philippines serves as one of the most crucial partners of the US in the Indo-Pacific, especially as the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration continues to prioritize playing an active role in securing its waters from China’s coercive and expansionist activities.
Since 2023, the Philippines has not only bolstered its defence cooperation with its ally and partners, but it has also been strengthening its national capacity by prioritising its military modernisation programme and implementing maritime security-related legislation such as the Maritime Zones Law and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Law.
Reinvigorated momentum between Manila and Washington
Additionally, Manila also seeks to hold China accountable for the destruction of the marine ecosystem within the Philippines’ EEZ due to reclamation activities and over-fishing. Accordingly, the Philippines is contemplating on filing another legal case — following the 2013 arbitration case filed by Manila against Beijing. While Manila has yet to officially decide on this, pursuing the case would continue to illustrate the Southeast Asian nation’s rules-based position on the South China Sea — a position Marcos Jr strongly emphasised in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2024.
Therefore, it is unlikely for the alliance to digress from where it stands today. In fact, there seems to be a reinvigorated momentum between Manila and Washington to explore more ways to strengthen the alliance in order to adapt to the changing realities of 21st century geopolitics. Nevertheless, Manila will still have to remain resolute in proactively negotiating with Washington to favorably position its interests in Trump’s transactional worldview of international politics.
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